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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to the one requirement of certificate of public convenience and
necessity which, he argued, negatives the right or the power to
grant a franchise. The court, after reviewing the pertinent pro-
visions of Act 169 of 1898 and Act 334 of 1946 properly concluded
that the city did have authority under those acts to enact ordi-
nances to grant franchises.
Defendant next contended that the ordinance was an uncon-
stitutional discrimination between the Baton Rouge Bus Com-
pany and others in a like situation. In rejecting this contention
the court took cognizance of the chaotic condition of transporta-
tion which in the interests of the public impelled the city council
to resort to one integrated bus system. Such action, said the
court, "cannot be said to have been arbitrary and'capricious."
TAXATION
Charles A. Reynard*
In the course of discussing the work of the court during the
1949-1950 term a year ago,' the writer called attention to a tax
case 2 in which it appeared that an issue of due process of law
had been mistakenly treated as one involving equal protection-
a mistake which did not affect the result. In that case the tax-
payer, a pipeline company, was protesting the inclusion of its
property within the limits of a levee district when adjacent lands
were excluded-both being within the spillway of the district.
Although the taxpayer raised the objection of equal protection
of the law, it was apparent that the real onus of its complaint, if
any, was the manner in which the boundaries of the district were
defined. This gave rise to the question whether the act creating
the district was such a legislative "gerrymander" as to take the
taxpayer's money without due process of law or whether suffi-
cient benefit would be derived from the creation of the district
to justify the inclusion of the taxpayer's property within it. Dur-
ing the term just past the identical question was raised in Bahry
v. West Ascension Consolidated Drainage District,3 this time so
clearly that it was recognized and treated as a due process
question.
Plaintiffs in the Bahry case were taxpayers residing within
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 214 (1951).
2. Interstate Oil Pipeline Co. v. Guilbeau, 217 La. 160, 46 So. 2d 113 (1950).
3. 218 La. 1028, 51 So. 2d 614 (1951).
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the City of Donaldsonville who sought to restrain the levy of
taxes by the defendant drainage district of which the city was
only a part, on the ground that the city was already served by
a drainage system installed some years ago at considerable ex-
pense, and hence contended that the proposed system of drainage
would confer no benefit upon their property. In the face of con-
flicting testimony on the subject of potential benefit to be con-
ferred the trial court dismissed the case and the supreme court
affirmed, invoking traditional doctrines of due process of law.4
The only other tax case of significance during the term,
Giamalva v. Cooper, Collector of Revenue,5 represents a con-
quest of reality over conceptualism. It was a taxpayer's suit to
recover taxes paid on a slot machine pursuant to the provisions
of Act 6 of 1948.6 Plaintiff contended that the statute offended
the constitutional exhortation that "Gambling is a vice and the
Legislature shall pass laws to suppress it,"7 by purporting to
legalize the operation of gambling devices since the tax exaction
was denominated a "license." A primary difficulty with this con-
tention is found in the legislative act itself where it is clearly
stated that "Payment of the license tax imposed by this sub-
section shall not be held to legalize the operation of any machine
or device defined herein which is prohibited by law." It was on
the strength of this legislative disclaimer alone that the trial court
dismissed the case. The supreme court affirmed and went on to
point out the "difference between licenses or privileges to engage
in certain businesses or pursuits which are subject to regulation
under the police power, and a license or excise tax levied solely
for revenue under the taxing power of the government," 8 a dis-
tinction which is firmly rooted in our jurisprudence, both state
and federal. By refusing to be dissuaded by semantic difficulties
4. "It is the established jurisprudence that the determination of the
property to be included within a drainage district is a matter within the
sound discretion of the Police Jury, on whom the Legislature has conferred
the power of creating the district, and that the courts may not interfere with
the exercise of discretion by that body in the absence of arbitrary action and
plain abuse-for it is only in such cases that the action can be rightfully
characterized as so oppressive as to be confiscatory and, thus, violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution .... The benefit will, of
course, be greater to those properties nearer the canals but some benefit,
however slight, will be derived by all of the property. This suffices, as it is
not the function of the judiciary to measure the benefit; our role is to deter-
mine whether the inclusion of the land is confiscatory." 218 La. 1034, 51 So.
2d 616 (1951).
5. 217 La. 979, 47 So. 2d 790 (1950).
6. La. R.S. (1950) 47:375.
7. La. Const. 1921, Art. XIX, § 8.
8. 217 La. 979, 985, 47 So. 2d 790, 792 (1950).
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the court has certainly reached a sound conclusion; any other
result would shock the conscience of a law-abiding taxpaying
public. Taxation has long been regarded as the individual's con-
tribution to the cost of maintaining government.9 Enlightened
legislators have traditionally sought to apportion the exaction in
accordance with the contributor's ability to pay. Tax legislation
of the type involved here represents a further desirable step by
imposing a heavier tax burden on those persons whose illegal
activities increase the ever-mounting cost of governmental oper-
ation.
9. The classical definition by Cooley provides: "Taxes are the enforced
proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the state by
virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government and for all publio
needs." Cooley, The Law of Taxation 61, § 1 (4 ed. 1924).
